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Abstract
To ensure security in data transmission is one of the most important issues for wireless relay
networks, and physical layer security is an attractive alternative solution to address this issue. In this
paper, we consider a cooperative network, consisting of one source node, one destination node, one
eavesdropper node, and a number of relay nodes. Specifically, the source may select several relays to
help forward the signal to the corresponding destination to achieve the best security performance.
However, the relays may have the incentive not to report their true private channel information
in order to get more chances to be selected and gain more payoff from the source. We propose
a Vickey-Clark-Grove (VCG) based mechanism and an Arrow-d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (AGV)
based mechanism into the investigated relay network to solve this cheating problem. In these two
different mechanisms, we design different “transfer payment” functions to the payoff of each selected
relay and prove that each relay gets its maximum (expected) payoff when it truthfully reveals its
private channel information to the source. And then, an optimal secrecy rate of the network can be
achieved. After discussing and comparing the VCG and AGV mechanisms, we prove that the AGV
mechanism can achieve all of the basic qualifications (incentive compatibility, individual rationality
and budget balance) for our system. Moreover, we discuss the optimal quantity of relays that the
source node should select. Simulation results verify efficiency and fairness of the VCG and AGV
mechanisms, and consolidate these conclusions.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most important issues in wireless communications due to the broad-
cast nature of wireless radio channels. In recent years, besides the traditional cryptographic
mechanisms, information-theoretic-based physical layer security has been developing fast.
The concept of “wiretap channel” was first introduced by Wyner [2], who showed that
perfect secrecy of transmitted data from the source to the legitimate receiver is achievable
in degraded broadcast channels. In follow-up work, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman further
determined the secrecy capacity in the Gaussian wire-tap channel [3]. Later, Csiszar and
Komer extended Wyner’s work to non-degraded broadcast channels and found an expression
of secrecy capacity [4].
When considering a wireless relay network, realization of secrecy capacity is much more
complicated. In [5], the authors studied the secrecy capacity of a relay channel with orthog-
onal components in the presence of a passive eavesdropper node. In [6], [7], the authors
demonstrated that cooperation among relay nodes can dramatically improve the physical
layer security in a given wireless relay network, And in [8]–[10], the authors investigated
the physical layer security with friendly jammer in the relay networks. In the related work
mentioned above, the channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be known at both the
transmitter and the receiver. All these schemes are assumed under true channel information
reported by relay nodes, and the optimal solutions in these works will not hold anymore
if the fake channel information is reported. However, in practice, the relay node always
measures its own channel gains and distributes the information to others through a control
channel. There is no guarantee that it reveals its private information honestly. Hence, the
most critical problem is how to select efficient relay nodes to optimize the total secrecy
rate in the network, while some selfish relays may report false information to the source to
increase their own utilities. In [11], the reputation methods are designed to achieve this goal.
However, all these methods require a delicate and complex “detection scheme” to monitor and
capture the liar nodes. It needs a lot of signal consumption like an independent entity called
“Trust Manager” to runs on each node. Besides, it also demands large amount of data like
“REP MESSAGE”,“REP VAL” to record the intermediate variable in the process. Moreover,
this method requires long time of observation because of low speed of convergence. It might
be impractical to use these reputation based scheme in cooperative relay network.
In recent years, the game theory is widely applied into wireless and communication
3networks to solve resource allocation problems [12]–[17]. In the area of mechanism design, a
field in the game theory studying solution concepts for a class of private information games,
a game designer is interested in the game’s outcome and wants to motivate the players to
disclose their private information by designing the payoff structure [18]–[20]. For example,
the well-known VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism [21]–[23] is a dominant-strategy
mechanism, which can achieve ex-post incentive compatibility (truth-telling is a dominant
strategy for every player in the game). However, it cannot implement the budget balance of
the game [24], [25], which costs extra payment from the players and decrease their payoffs.
Thus, it cannot be properly used in the relay network we focus on. Compared with the
VCG mechanism, the AGV (Arrow-d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet) mechanism [26], [27] can
also solve the truth-telling problem. It is an incentive efficient mechanism that can maximize
the expected total payoff of all the players in the game. Additionally it achieves the budget
balance under a weaker participation requirement [28], [29].
In this paper, we mainly focus on a relay network, in which all the channels are orthogonal
and each relay’s private channel information is unknown by others. Under these conditions,
we apply the ideas of the VCG and AGV mechanism and prove that the transfer function can
meet the basic requirements of the wireless relay networks and help achieve the truth-telling
target. We find and prove that the unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium [28] is achieved when
all the relays in the network reveal the truth. The incentive to report false information will lead
to a loss in each relay node’s own (expected) payment. In other words, the competing relay
nodes are enforced to obey the selection criterion and cooperate with each other honestly.
Furthermore, there is no extra cost paid in the system when applying the AGV mechanism
while the VCG mechanism can not. Since the AGV mechanism is budget balanced, which
means the total transfer payment of all relay nodes equals zero. Simulation results show
that the relay nodes can maximize their utilities when they all report their true channel
information. Any cheating to the source leads to certain loss in the total secrecy rate as well
as the payoff of relays themselves. We also observe that the optimal choice for the system is
based on the relays’ channel information, but in a majority of cases selecting only one relay
node for transmitting data can attain the largest secrecy rate of the system. In addition, we
prove with simulations that the best strategy for each relay node under this payoff structure
is to improve its own channel condition to enlarge its secrecy rate and always report the truth
to the source.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model for a
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Fig. 1. System model for relay network with eavesdropper.
relay network is presented. In Section III, we elaborate on the basic definition and qualifica-
tions of the mechanism design, and discuss the VCG mechanism and AGV mechanism. In
Section IV, we demonstrate the mechanism solutions to enforce relays reveal the true private
information, and analyze these mechanism solutions. Simulation results are shown in Section
V, and the conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Considering a general cooperative network shown in Fig. 1. It consists of one source node,
one destination node, one eavesdropper node, and I relay nodes, which are denoted by S, D,
E, and Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , I , respectively. This cooperative network is conducted in two phases.
In phase 1, the source node broadcasts a signal x to the destination node and all the relay
nodes, where only N (N ≤ I) nodes can decode this signal correctly due to their different
geographical conditions. In phase 2, the source node decides which nodes of those N relays
to forword information to the destination node. The destination node combines messages from
the source and relays, according to the reported channel gains of both relay-destination and
relay-eavesdropper links. During the whole process, eavesdropper node wiretaps the messages
from the source node and the relay nodes. We assume the orthogonal channel having the
5same bandwidth W . The source node hopes to gain the highest secrecy rate by properly
selecting some efficient relay nodes based on their reported channel information. We denote
the number of selected relay nodes by K (K ≤ N) and the set of K relay nodes by K.
In the first phase, the received signal ys,d, ys,ri, and ys,e at destination node D, relays Ri,
and eavesdropper E, respectively, can be expressed as
ys,d =
√
Pshs,dx+ ns,d, (1)
and
ys,ri =
√
Pshs,rix+ ns,ri, (2)
and
ys,e =
√
Pshs,ex+ ns,e, (3)
where Ps represents the transmit power to the destination node from the source node, x is
the unit-energy information symbol transmitted by the source in phase 1, hs,d, hs,ri, and hs,e
are the channel gains from S to D, Ri and E respectively. ns,d, ns,ri and ns,e represent the
noise at destination node, relay nodes and eavesdropper node.
In the second phase, the received signal from the i-th relay node (Ri ∈ K) to the destination
node and eavesdropper node can be expressed as
yri,d =
√
Prihri,dx+ nri,d, (4)
and
yri,e =
√
Prihri,ex+ nri,e, (5)
respectively, where Pri denotes the transmit power of relay node Ri under the power constraint
Pri ≤ Pmax, hri,d is the channel gain between Ri and D, and hri,e is the channel gain between
Ri and E. We assume that channel gain contains both the path loss and the Rayleigh fading
factor. Without loss of generality, we also assume that all the links have the same noise power
which is denoted by σ2. The decode-and-forward (DF) protocol is used for relaying.
The direct transmission signal-to-noise-ratios (SNR) at the destination node and eaves-
dropper from the source are SNRs,d =
Psh
2
s,d
σ2
, and SNRs,e =
Psh
2
s,e
σ2
, respectively. The SNR
at the destination node and eavesdropper node from relays are SNRri,d =
Prih
2
ri,d
σ2
, and
6SNRri,e =
Prih
2
ri,e
σ2
. Therefore, the channel rate for relay Ri to destination D is
Ci,d = W log2 (1 + SNRri,d) . (6)
Similarly, the channel rate for relay Ri to eavesdropper E is
Ci,e = W log2(1 + SNRri,e). (7)
Then, the secrecy rate achieved by Ri can be defined as [31]
Ci,s = (Ci,d − Ci,e)
+ =

W log2

1 + Prih2ri,dσ2
1 +
Prih
2
ri,e
σ2




+
, (8)
where (x)+ = max{x, 0}.
Besides, the secrecy rate assuming maximal ratio combining (MRC) at the destination and
the eavesdropper can be written as
Cd,sys = W log2
(
1 + SNRs,d +
∑
i∈K
SNRri,d
)
(9)
and
Ce,sys = W log2
(
1 + SNRs,e +
∑
i∈K
SNRri,e
)
, (10)
respectively, such that the total secrecy rate attained by the system is
Cs,sys = (Cd,sys − Ce,sys)
+
= W log2
(
1 + SNRs,d +
∑
i∈K
SNRri,d
)
−W log2
(
1 + SNRs,e +
∑
i∈K
SNRri,e
)
(11)
= W log2

1 + SNRs,d +
∑
i∈K
SNRri,d
1 + SNRs,e +
∑
i∈K
SNRri,e

 .
III. MECHANISM DESIGN
In this paper, we use mechanism design as the framework to create an efficient way
to prevent relay nodes from cheating in the process of selection. This section provides
an overview of essential concepts in mechanism design, the VCG mechanism and AGV
7mechanism.
A. Basic Definitions and Qualifications
Consider a public system consisting of I agents, 1, 2, . . . I . Each agent i ∈ {1, 2 . . . I} has
its private information θi ∈ Θi, which is known by itself only. A social choice function F is
defined as
F : Θ1 ×Θ2 × . . .×ΘI → O,
where O stands for a set of possible outcomes.
A mechanismM is represented by the tuple (F, t1, . . . , tI), where ti is the transfer payment
of agent i when the social choice is F . The utility of agent i: vi
[
F
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
]
depends
on the outcome o = F
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
and the true information of agent i: θi, where θˆi denotes the
reported information of agent i, as opposed to θi. Similarly, θˆ−i = {θˆ1, . . . , θˆi−1, θˆi+1, . . . , θˆI}
is the reported information of all other agents. So the total payoff or welfare of agent i can
be written as the following function:
ui
(
θˆi, θˆ−i, θi
)
= vi
[
F
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
]
+ ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
. (12)
The objective of mechanism M is to choose a desirable set of transfer payments ti. Thus,
each agent in the mechanism will achieve its maximum payoffs. In the following, we define
some properties for the mechanism.
Definition 1: A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if the truth-telling is the best
strategy for the agents: θˆi = θi, which means that agents have no incentives to reveal false
information. The dominant-strategy IC is defined as
ui
(
θi, θˆ−i, θi
)
≥ ui
(
θˆi, θˆ−i, θi
)
, ∀θˆi, θi ∈ Θi, θˆ−i ∈ Θ−i. (13)
Definition 2: In an individual rational (IR) mechanism, rational agents are expected to gain
a higher utility from actively participating in the mechanism than from avoiding it. Especially,
in the dominant strategy IR can be expressed as
ui
(
θˆi, θˆ−i, θi
)
≥ 0, ∀θi ∈ Θi. (14)
A mechanism that is both incentive-compatible and individual rational is said to be strategy-
proof.
8Definition 3: In a budget balanced (BB) mechanism, the sum of all agents transfer payments
is zero, which implies that there is no transfer payment paid from the mechanism designer
to the agents or the other way around. The BB is defined as
I∑
i=1
ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
= 0, ∀θi ∈ Θi. (15)
B. VCG Mechanism
Groves introduced a group of mechanisms which satisfy IC and IR. The Groves mecha-
nisms are characterized by the following transfer payment function:
ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
=
I∑
j 6=i
vj
[
F
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θˆj
]
− τi
(
θˆ−i
)
, (16)
where τi(.) can be any function of θˆi. The VCG mechanism is an important special case of
the Groves mechanisms for which
τi
(
θˆ−i
)
=
I∑
j 6=i
vj
[
F ∗
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θˆj
]
, (17)
where F ∗
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
is the outcome of the mechanism when agent i withdraws from the
mechanism. Thus, in the VCG mechanism agent i could attain payoff as
ui
(
θˆi, θˆ−i, θi
)
= vi
[
F
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
]
+ ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
= vi
[
F
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
, θi
]
+
I∑
j 6=i
vj
[
F
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θˆj
]
−
I∑
j 6=i
vj
[
F ∗
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θˆj
]
. (18)
As will be proved in the next section, the VCG mechanism can satisfy both the incentive
compatibility and individual rationality of each agent. However, the VCG mechanism is not
budget-balanced and requires a third party agent to mediate between mechanism designer
and agents.
C. AGV Mechanism
The AGV mechanism, an extension of the Groves mechanism, is possible to achieve IC,
IR and BB. It is an “expected form” of the Groves mechanism and its transfer payment
9function is defined as
ti
(
θˆi, θˆ−i
)
= Eθ
−i
{
I∑
j 6=i
vj
[
F
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θˆj
]}
− τi
(
θˆ−i
)
. (19)
The first term of ti is the expected total utility of agents j 6= i when agent i reports its
information θˆi with the assumption that other agents report the truth. It is the function of
agent i’s report information only, exclusive of the actual strategies of agents j 6= i, which
making the AGV mechanism different from the VCG mechanism.
In the AGV mechanism it is possible to design the τi(.) to satisfy BB. Let
Φi
(
θˆi
)
= Eθ
−i
{
I∑
j 6=i
vj
[
F
(
θˆj , θˆ−j
)
, θˆj
]}
(20)
and
τi
(
θˆ−i
)
=
−
I∑
j 6=i
Φj
(
θˆj
)
I − 1
, (21)
then budget balance can be achieved because each agent also pays an equal share of total
transfer payments distributed to the other agents, none of which depends on its own report
information. We will prove this property in the following section.
IV. MECHANISM SOLUTIONS
In this section, we first describe how mechanism design is applied in the relay system
and prove that there is no equilibrium achieved if no transfer payment is introduced to relay
nodes. Then, we show the practical mapping from the utility, transfer payment, and payoff
of the VCG mechanism and AGV mechanism to the wireless cooperative network. Finally,
we will compare and analyze the difference between two mechanisms.
A. Mechanism Implementation
In the network, each relay node reports its own channel information (hri,d, hri,e) to the
source node which can be seen as different agents report their own private information to
mechanism designer. Assume
{(
h˜r1,d, h˜r1,e
)
,
(
h˜r2,d, h˜r2,e
)
, . . . ,
(
h˜rK ,d, h˜rK ,e
)}
is a realiza-
tion of channel gains at one time slot, and relay nodes report their information
{(
hˆr1,d, hˆr1,e
)
,(
hˆr2,d, hˆr2,e
)
, . . . ,
(
hˆrK ,d, hˆrK ,e
)}
to the source node. Though the information may not be
true, the source node will still select relay nodes based on them. Define Ri’s private channel
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information as g˜i =
{
h˜ri,d, h˜ri,e
}
. Thus, according to (8), the secrecy rate of relay i depends
on g˜i. The source node will choose K relay nodes for transmitting according to the relay’s
reported information gˆ. The principle of source node is to find the K relays to maximize the
secrecy rates. The outcome function can be stated as
F (gˆ) = argmax
K∑
Ri∈K
Ci,s(gˆi). (22)
We define pi as the price per unit of secrecy rate achieved by the relay. The relays in the
network are assumed to be rational and fair-minded, which means that although they are
selfish, none is malicious. The object of relay is to make itself chosen for transmitting so
that it can gain payoff. Due to the channel orthogonality, the utility of Ri can be expressed
as
Di =

 piCi,s, Ri ∈ K,0, otherwise. (23)
The total payoff (utility) from the system can also be expressed as
D =
K∑
i=1
Di. (24)
We assume that the channel information is the private information of each relay, and thus,
the source is unable to know whether the reported information is true or not. Since only
the relay nodes selected by the source for secure data transmission can get the payoff, they
will not report their true information to the source in order to win greater opportunity to
be selected. In this situation, it can cause unfairness in selection and damage the expected
payoff of those unselected. It can also decrease the total payoff paid by the system which can
be expressed as Dˆ ≤ D˜, where Dˆ represents the total the total payoff calculated according
to the information reported by the relay nodes. D˜ represents the total payoff when all the
relay nodes report the truth. These results can sabotage the reliability of the system and
eavesdropper can easily sniff the transmitted messages.
Firstly, we prove that no equilibrium can be achieved under this condition.
Proposition 1: Assuming that Ri does not know other relay’s channel information, respec-
tively, secrecy rate. But it knows that each relay obeys a certain probability density function
defined as p
(
C˜j,s
)(
0 ≤ C˜j,s <∞, j 6= i
)
. Then, Ri has an incentive tendency to exaggerate
its Cˆi,s to ∞ to get the maximum expected payoff.
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Proof: Ri’s expected payoff can be also be expressed as
Di(gˆi) = piC˜i,sP(Ri ∈ K), (25)
where P (Ri ∈ K) represents the probability of Ri when being chosen. Considering the
principle of choosing relay, P (Ri ∈ K) ∝ Cˆi,s and when Cˆi,s → ∞, P (Ri ∈ K) → 1,
so that Ri gets its maximum payoff at infinity. This indicates that every relay node has the
incentive to exaggerate its channel information to the source, and thus, there is no equilibrium
achieved under this kind of payoff allocation.
B. VCG-based Mechanism Solution
In order to prevent relay nodes from reporting distorted channel information, we propose
an effective self-enforcing truth-telling mechanism to solve this problem. By using the VCG-
based mechanism, the honest relay nodes gain the maximum payoff, as any cheating in the
process will lead to decrease in payoff. Like the VCG mechanism, we introduced this transfer
payment of Ri as
ti (gˆi, gˆ−i) =
K∑
j 6=i
Dj(gˆj)−
K∑
j 6=i
D∗j (gˆj), (26)
where D∗j (.) denotes the utility of Rj when Ri does not participate in the system. So the
total payoff of Ri is:
Ui (gˆi) = Di(gˆi) + ti(gˆi, gˆ−i)
= Di(gˆi) +
N∑
j 6=i
Dj(gˆj)−
K∑
j 6=i
D∗j (gˆj) (27)
=
K∑
j
Dj(gˆj)−
K∑
j 6=i
D∗j (gˆj).
If one relay node claims a higher hˆri,d or a lower hˆri,e than the reality to make its secrecy
rate larger, it may get more chances to be selected by the source node, but also will pay
a higher transfer payoff to those unselected. On the contrary, if one relay node reports a
lower secrecy rate than reality, it will receive the compensation from other relay nodes at the
cost of less chances to be selected. By adding this transfer function, we will discuss some
properties of this VCG-based mechanism as follows.
Proposition 2: By using the VCG transfer function (26) to balance the payoff allocation,
12
relay node Ri can gain its largest payoff when it reports the true private channel information.
Proof: We can see from (27) that the payoff of each relay Ri is the total utility of all
relays
∑K
j Dj(gˆj) when relay participates in the system, minuses the total utility of all other
relays
∑K
j 6=iD
∗
j (gˆj) when relay i withdraws from the system. It is obvious that relay i cannot
influence the value of
∑K
j 6=iD
∗
j (gˆj). Therefore, in order to maximize its own payoff, relay i
seeks to maximize the total utility of the system. According to our relay selection principle,
the total utility of all relays depends on the chosen K relay’s true channel information. If
and only if each relay reports the true information (gˆi = g˜i), the total utility is maximized.
Hence, the payoff of Ri is maximized.
Proposition 3: Every rational relay node in the system takes part in the VCG-based
mechanism for its own benefit.
Proof: It is easy to show that∑Kj Dj(gˆj) ≥∑Kj 6=iD∗j (gˆj) when the IC achieved (gˆi = g˜i),
and the equality holds when Ri is not selected (Di = 0). Therefore, for each relay Ri ,
Ui(gi) ≥ 0 and participating into the system is an optimal choice for a rational relay.
Proposition 4: By applying the VCG-based mechanism in our system, we cannot achieve
the BB condition: the total transfer payments
∑N
i=1 ti < 0, which means that we need the
mechanism designer or a third party to pay parts of the payoff.
Proof: There are two cases of Ri:
• It is not selected by the source node (Ri /∈ K), then obviously: ti (gˆi, gˆ−i) =
∑K
j 6=iDj(gˆj)−∑K
j 6=iD
∗
j (gˆj) = 0.
• It is selected by the source node (Ri ∈ K), then ti(gˆi, gˆ−i) =
∑K
j 6=iDj(gˆj)−
∑K
j 6=iD
∗
j (gˆj) <
0. Because of the withdrawal of Ri, another relay node with a lower secrecy rate will
be selected and its utility D∗ will get bigger.
Combine these two cases together: K relay nodes will receive negative transfer payment
that makes the total transfer payments
∑K
i=1 ti < 0. Hence, the BB is not satisfied in the
VCG-based mechanism.
C. AGV-based Mechanism Solution
From the discussions above we can know that the VCG-based mechanism can enforce
every relay node to tell the true private channel information, which can effectively solve the
cheating problem in our system. However, as the mechanism designer, we need to pay some
extra payments to the system because the VCG-based mechanism fails the condition of BB.
To compensate for this loss, we improve the VCG-based mechanism to the AGV-based one.
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In the AGV-based mechanism, we change the transfer payment of Ri as
ti(gˆi, gˆ−i) = Φi(gˆi)−
1
K − 1
K∑
j 6=i
Φj(gˆj) (28)
where
Φi (gˆi) = Egˆ
−i
[
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Dj(gˆj)
]
=
K∑
j=1,j 6=i
Egˆ
−i
[Dj(gˆj)] (29)
represents the sum of the other relay nodes’ expected utilities given the reported information
gˆi.
Like in the VCG-based mechanism, we can prove that only if the relay nodes reveal the
true channel information, they can obtain the maximum payoff in the AGV-based mechanism.
There is only one equilibrium under this kind of payoff allocation.
Proposition 5: By using the AGV-based mechanism, the relay node Ri can gain its largest
expected payoff when it reports its true private channel information to the source node.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we consider the expected payoff of R1. Since R1 only
knows its own channel information, we can calculate the payoff according to the transfer
payment function (28) as
E[U1(gˆ1)] = E[D1(gˆ1) + t1(gˆ1, gˆ−1)]
= E[D1(gˆ1)] + Egˆ
−1
[
K∑
j 6=1
Dj(gˆ1)
]
−
1
K − 1
K∑
j 6=1
Φj(gˆj)
= E
[
K∑
j=1
Dj(gˆj)
]
−
1
K − 1
K∑
j 6=1
Φj(gˆj). (30)
We can see that there are two terms in the right side of (30). The first one represents the
total expected payoff when R1 reports gˆ1 as its channel information (the expectation is
calculated by R1 itself). Since the other term being independent of g˜1, only the first term
decides the expected payoff of R1. As we have shown above, the total payoff is based on
the real secrecy rate. Only when the K relays with top K secrecy rate are selected, the total
payoff will be maximized. Any cheating leads to a decrease in all relays’ total payoff, and
therefore, the expectation E[U1(gˆ1)] can get the maximum when R1 reports its true channel
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information. Similarly, each relay node in the network has an incentive to report its true
channel information (gˆi = g˜i). Thus, the equilibrium is achieved under this condition.
Proposition 6: Each relay node could gain a positive expected payoff in the AGV-based
mechanism, which ensures that every relay would like to take part in this mechanism.
Proof: From (28) and (29) it is easy to derive Ri’s expected payoff:
E[Ui(gˆi)] =E
[
K∑
j=1
D(gˆj)
]
−
1
K − 1
K∑
j 6=i
K∑
k 6=j
E−k[Dk(gˆj)]
=E
[
K∑
j=1
D(gˆj)
]
−
1
K − 1
{
(K − 1)
K∑
j=1
E[Dj(gˆj)]
−
K∑
k 6=i
E−k[Dk(gˆi)]
}
(31)
=
1
K − 1
E−j
[
K∑
j 6=i
Dj(gˆi)
]
.
According to (25), Di > 0 if Ri is selected and Di = 0 if not. Since among all the relay
nodes there are always some nodes being selected, the right side of the equation above
E−j
[∑N
j 6=iDj(gˆi)
]
> 0. Therefore, Ri can gain a payoff more than 0, and thus, the IR is
satisfied.
Proposition 7: In the AGV-based mechanism, the system can achieve budget balance,
which means that we, as the mechanism designer, will not pay any extra payment to the
system.
Proof: If we calculate the total transfer payment of all relays, we could get
N∑
i=1
ti(gˆi, gˆ−i) =
N∑
i=1
Φi(gˆi)−
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Φj(gˆj)
=
N∑
i=1
Φi(gˆi)−
N∑
j=1
Φj(gˆj) = 0. (32)
This implies that the proposed transfer function can realize a payment reallocation among
the relay nodes, and no extra payment is required to be paid by the system or by the relay
nodes.
D. The Value of K
In the discussion above, we assumed that the value of K is fixed and the source node
always choose K relays for cooperating. However, it is easy to see that different K can lead
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to different results in the total secrecy rate of the network. So we did some research to figure
out the optimal amount K of relays the source node should select.
In our system model, the total secrecy attained of the system is (11). By using the AGV
mechanism, each relay reports the truth. Now we assume each relay’s reported information
is SNRri,d and SNRri,e. Let ki =
SNRri,d
SNRri,e
. Sort ki in descending order, and get k(1) ≥ k(2) ≥
. . . ≥ k(N), k(i) ∈ {k1, k2, . . . , kN}. Obviously, the relay which has a larger Ci,s also has a
larger ki according to (8). We denote that R(1) is the best relay which has the largest secrecy
rate, R(2) is the second best, and so forth. Then the optimal selection strategy of the source
node is described as below:
1. Select R(1) for transmitting. Let i = 1 and calculate Ψ1 =
1+SNRs,d+SNRr(1),d
1+SNRs,e+SNRr(1),e
.
2. For i < N , if Ψi < k(i+1), proceed step 3 and if Ψi ≥ k(i+1), skip to step 4.
3. Select R(i+1) and calculate Ψi+1 =
1+SNRs,d+
∑i+1
j=1 SNRr(j),d
1+SNRs,e+
∑i+1
j=1 SNRr(j),e
. Then let i = i + 1 and go
back to step 2.
4. Let K = i and stop.
Proposition 8: The system can attain the largest secrecy rate by selecting K relays for
transmitting data, where K is decided by the process above.
Proof: By the selection strategy of the source described above, it is easy to prove that
ΨK is the maximum among {Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . ,ΨN}. According to (11), the total secrecy rate of
the network when selecting i relays can be expressed as Cs,sys(i) = W log2Ψi. When i = K,
ΨK can get the maximum, and obviously Cs,sys(K) is the largest. Therefore, it is the best
choice for the source to select K relays in the system.
In many cases, because of the geographic conditions, the direct transmission is very weak
compared with relay transmission which means that the selected relay has a SNRri,d >
SNRri,e ≫ SNRs,d > SNRs,e. So SNRri,d ≫ (1 + SNRs,d), SNRri,e ≫ (1 + SNRs,e) and
Ψ1 ≈ k(1) > k(2). Thus, K = 1 is the best choice, which means the source should only select
one best relay for transmitting data. More than one relay node would lead to a decrease in
the total secrecy rate of the system.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results of the wireless relay system in the VCG-based
mechanism and AGV-based mechanism, respectively. Specifically, to simplify the calculation
and simulation, we assume that each relay node first calculates its own secrecy rate according
to its channel information, and then reports it to the source. Without considering the process
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Fig. 2. Payoff of Ri when different secrecy rates are reported in the VCG-based mechanism.
of calculating piCi,s, we assign random values xi to indicate piCi,s(i = 1, 2, . . . , N), which
not affect the “outcome” or source’s selection result. Furthermore, we assume that though Ri
does not know other relays’ channel information, it knows that every reported value obeys
the probability density function: e−xi
(
xi ∈ [0,∞) and
∫ +∞
0
e−xidxi = 1
)
.
Firstly, we consider a system with N = 4 relay nodes and from which the source node
chooses K = 2 relays. A random sample of these relay nodes’ secrecy rates is obtained as
[1.0132, 0.6091, 0.3885, 1.3210] and the price per unit of secrecy rate pi = 1 is assumed.
Fig. 2 shows the variation of Ri’s payoff when the reported values change in the VCG-
based mechanism. Given that the other three nodes are honest, Ri(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) can get its
maximum payoff while reporting the truth. From Fig. 2 we can observe that when they all
tell the truth, the larger the true value of secrecy rate of one relay node is, the more the
payoff it gains. For example, R4 has the largest secrecy rate (C˜4,s = 1.3210) and its payoff
is the largest up to 0.5822 when it reports the true value. It is higher than the other three
relay nodes’ payoff even though it is not as much as piC4,s = 1.3210, which is paid by the
destination node because of the transfer payment.
In Fig. 3 we demonstrate the transfer payment of each relay they calculate from their own
angles when they report different secrecy rates. As is evident in the figure, each relay has the
same transfer payment curve. This is because we assume each relay only knows the other
relays report secrecy rates obey the negative exponential distribution. So the difference of
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Fig. 3. Transfer payment of R1 when different secrecy rates are reported in the VCG-based mechanism.
the utility of the others relays whether the relay participates the mechanism or not is the
same for each relay. We can also see that they are all monotone decreasing because the
larger the reported value is, the more transfer payoff should be paid to others. Besides, as the
reported secrecy rate continuously increases, the transfer payoff will tend to a fixed value. It
is because this very large reported value will always be larger than the others, the “outcome”
or source’s selection will be fixed whether this relay node is in this system or not. So the
transfer payment will be a fixed value when the reported value becomes very large. The
curve of Ri’s payoff in Fig. 2 is the same reason.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the results when we use the AGV-based mechanism in the system.
In Fig. 4, four curves show the expected payoff of R1-R4. It is obvious to see that each relay
maximizes its payoff when they report the true secrecy rate. Compared with Fig. 2, we can
see each relay’s payoff is higher in the AGV-based mechanism than that in the VCG-based
mechanism. It means that the AGV-based mechanism can maximize all the relay nodes payoff
which is more attractive for relay node to attend. From Fig. 5 we also find that R1’s and R4’s
transfer payoffs are negative while the other two’s are positive when they tell the truth. This
is because R1 and R4 are actually selected by the source node and need to pay the transfer
payment while R2 and R3 are not. By using the AGV-based mechanism, the relay nodes with
smaller secrecy rate will get compensations from those with larger ones. It can balance the
payment allocation of the system and benefit those in worse physical conditions. Furthermore,
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Fig. 4. Expected payoff of Ri when different secrecy rates are reported in the AGV-based mechanism.
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Fig. 5. Expected transfer payment of Ri when different secrecy rates are reported in the AGV-based mechanism.
we calculate the expected transfer payoff of Ri when they all report the truth: t1 = −0.1247,
t2 = 0.1570, t3 = 0.2831, t4 = −0.3154 and t1 + t2 + t3 + t4 = 0, which is in accord with
the equation (25). Hence the system is budget balanced and no extra payment is paid into or
out of the network. In conclusion, we can confirm that the AGV-based mechanism is more
compatible for our system than the VCG-based mechanism. Moreover, we show the payoff
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Fig. 7. Effectiveness of the reported secrecy of R1 on the expected payoff at different K in the AGV-based mechanism.
of R1 with changing secrecy rate when it reports different secrecy rate in Fig. 6. It is obvious
that no matter what true secrecy rate of R1 is, R1 always gains its maximum payoff when it
reports its own true secrecy rate.
In addition, we analyze the effects of the reported secrecy rate versus the value of K in the
AGV-based mechanism. As an example, we set the relay node R1 be the interested one and
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Fig. 8. Effectiveness of the reported secrecy of R1 on the expected transfer payment at different K in the AGV-based
mechanism.
its secrecy rate is 1.0132. In Fig. 7, we observe that the relay node R1 achieve the maximum
expected payoffs when it reports the true secrecy rate with different K. When K equals to 1,
the payoff of the relay node R1 is the lowest. And the larger the reported value, the smaller
the expected payoff shows. When K equals 2 and 3, the expected payoff becomes a fixed
value as the reported secrecy rate continuously increases. Because the transfer payment is a
part of the total payoff, the change of the expected payoff can be translated by the transfer
payment, which is shown in Fig. 8. When K equals to 1 and this relay reports a larger secrecy
rate, the expected transfer payment is a small and negative value. So the expected payoff
of the relay node is minor. When K equals to 2 and 3, the slope of the curves becomes
smoother as the reported value increases. This shows the change trend of the relay node’s
payoff from the other point of view. Meanwhile, it implies that the transfer payoff is helpful
to control the payoff for fairness among relay nodes.
Finally, we focus on the effect of the value of K on the total system secrecy. Here we
assume W = ln 2 then Cs,sys(K) = ln(Ψ(k)). Let N = 6, the direct transmission SNR to
destination and eavesdropper are 9.64dB and 5.47dB, respectively, and given two random
samples for Ri’s report information (SNRri,d and SNRri,e). In one sample we assume each
value has the same order of magnitude with 1 (1dB < SNR < 10dB) : SNRri,d = {6.1734,
7.9489, 9.7429, 7.1886, 6.3783, 7.3411}, (dB); SNRri,e = {3.7700, 0.9927, 5.6543, 4.3645,
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Fig. 9. System secrecy rate at different K at bad SNR in the AGV-based mechanism.
0.6273, 6.1954}, (dB). In the other sample we assume each value has the same order of
magnitude with 10 (10dB < SNR < 20dB) : SNRri,d = {16.173, 17.948, 19.742, 17.188,
16.378, 17.341}, (dB); SNRri,e = {13.770, 10.992, 15.654, 14.364, 10.627, 16.1954}, (dB).
Similarly, we do this simulation with another group data of high SNR and low SNR as
follows: SNRri,d = {8.8149, 5.6809, 9.3701, 8.5822, 3.3896, 10.000}, (dB); SNRri,e =
{3.7700, 0.9927, 5.6543, 4.3645, 0.6273, 6.1954}, (dB); SNRri,d = {16.173, 17.948, 19.742,
17.188, 16.378, 17.341}, (dB); and SNRri,e = {15.227, 12.164, 14.522, 13.278, 12.746,
13.648}, (dB). The simulation result is showed in Fig. 9, and we can observe that in the
low SNR situation, Cs,sys is maximized when the source select 2 and 3 relays, respectively.
Thus, they attain the maximum secrecy at K = 2 and K = 3. However, in the high SNR
situation showed in Fig. 9, when all of the channel conditions are better, the best choice for
the system is to choose only one relay (K = 1) for transmitting. All these results are based
on the fact that all relays will reveal their true channel information which is ensured by the
AGV mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed and applied the ideas of mechanism design into the wireless
relay network to guarantee the strategy-proof during the process of relay selection when
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considering secure data transmission. We proved that by using the VCG mechanism and
AGV mechanism, each relay node gets its maximum payoff only when it reveals its true
channel information, and any deviation from the truth will lead to a loss in its own (expect)
payoff as well as the total secrecy rate. We compared these two mechanisms and illustrated
that the AGV mechanism is more compatible for our system when taking the budget balance
constraint into consideration. We proved that the strategy-proof and budget balance of the
system can be achieved in the AGV mechanism, which makes our model more practical
in reality. Simulation results verified these conclusions. Moreover, we proposed and proved
the best choice for the source node in deciding how many relays it should select to get the
maximum secrecy rate of the network. In good channel conditions with higher SNR, it is
better to select only one relay for transmitting data.
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